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Rural Poverty in Latin America
i 
 
Rural poverty no longer is high on the policy agenda in Latin America.  International agencies and national 
governments alike act as if rural poverty no longer matters or at least no longer deserves top priority.  The 
obvious explanation for this neglect is that Latin America has become an urban society and urban issues, 
for both political and economic reasons, command most of the attention of policy makers and external 
analysts.  The proportion of the population living in urban areas is as high as 92 per cent in Venezuela and 
in the three largest countries of the region it is between 78 per cent (in Brazil) and 72 per cent (in 
Colombia), with Mexico in between at 75 per cent.  Most people in Latin America live and work in the 
cities.  Moreover, in terms of absolute numbers, most poor people in Latin America now live in urban areas 
and obtain their livelihood in informal and formal urban sector activities.  Thus it is hardly surprising that 
poverty in Latin America is regarded as largely an urban phenomenon. 
 
Such a judgment, however, may be too hasty.  The available data, incomplete as they may be, suggest that 
rural poverty still is significant in many Latin American countries.  In Table 1 we have assembled 
information on 16 countries which account for 91.7 per cent of the total population of Latin America and 
the Caribbean.  The table contains information on the rural population as a percentage of the total 
population (column 5), and for various years (indicated in column 1), the percentage of the population 
below the poverty line in the rural areas (column 2), the cities (column 3) and in the country as a whole 
(column 4).  Finally, (in column 6) we indicate the number of rural poor as a percentage of the total 













Percentage of Population Below the 
Poverty Line 
Rural Population as 
per cent of 
Total Population 
Rural Poverty 
as per cent of 
Total Poverty 
 
  Year  Rural  Urban  Country     
             
Argentina  1986  17  12  13  12  16 
Brazil  1990     32.6     13.1     17.4  22  41 
Chile  1994  26  24  24  16  17 
Colombia  1992     31.2       9.9     18.8  28  46 Costa Rica  1992  25  25  25  51  51 
Ecuador  1994  47  25  35  42  56 
El Salvador  1992     55.7     43.1     48.3  55  63 
Guatemala  1986  75  54  68  59  65 
Honduras  1992  46  56  50  57  52 
Mexico  1992  46  30  36  25  32 
Nicaragua  1993     76.1     31.9     50.3  38  57 
Panama  1991  43  34  36  47  56 
Paraguay  1991     28.5     19.7     21.8  48  63 
Peru  1991  68     50.3  54  28  35 
Uruguay  1986  23  14  15  10  15 
Venezuela  1992  36  32  33    8    9 
             
Sources:  Population below the poverty line: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997, Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank 1997 (for Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru); United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,  Social Panorama of Latin America 1995, 
Santiago: ECLAC, 1995 (for Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela). 
Rural population as  per cent of total population: UNDP,  Human Development Report 1997, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997.  Rural poverty as per cent of total poverty: author’s calculations. 
 
 
Poverty in Table 1 refers to income poverty, i.e., the proportion of the population that has insufficient 
income in the sense that it falls below the poverty line.  It is clear from the table that the relative incidence 
of poverty is higher in the countryside than in the cities.  In Brazil, for example, 32.6 per cent of the rural 
population lived below the poverty line whereas only 13.1 per cent of the urban population were classified 
as living in poverty.  Indeed only in Honduras is poverty greater in the urban areas; in Costa Rica the 
incidence of poverty is the same in both sectors; everywhere else, the incidence of poverty is greater in the 
rural areas.  In Latin America as a whole, therefore, it is evident that the likelihood of a family living in 
poverty is much higher if that family resides in a rural area rather than in a city. 
 
Moreover, as regards the severity of poverty or depth of poverty, it is likely that on average the income of 
the rural poor falls further below the poverty line than does the income of the urban poor, although data to 
support this conjecture are absent.  It is well known however that average incomes are lower in the rural 
areas, often much lower, and unless this disadvantage is compensated by a much more equal distribution of 
income in the rural areas, it follows that the rural poor have a lower income on average than the urban poor.  
In other words, the poverty gap is greater in the countryside than in the cities.
ii 
 
Equally significant, in terms of capability poverty, there is no doubt that the rural population lives in greater 
poverty.  Illiteracy rates are higher; access to safe drinking water is lower; malnutrition is higher; access to 
basic health services and to basic education are lower; and even life expectancy almost certainly is lower.  
In other words, if the concept of poverty is broadened to include not only insufficient income but also lack 
of access to the services and institutions necessary for people to function at an acceptable level, it is 
apparent that the rural areas are at a great disadvantage. 
 In Table 2 an attempt is made to illustrate this proposition by providing data on the relative access of 
people in rural areas to health services (1985-95), safe water and sanitation (in both cases 1990-95).  The 
numbers in the table should be interpreted as probabilities, namely, the probability that a person living in 
the countryside will have access to a particular service compared to the probability that a person living in a 
city will have access to the same service.  For instance, in El Salvador, 78 per cent of the urban population 
have access to safe water compared to only 38 per cent of the rural population.  Hence a rural person is 





Table 2.  Indicators of Capability Poverty in Rural Areas 
 
  Relative Access to Services 
       
  Health  Safe Water  Sanitation 
       
Argentina  26    38    51 
Brazil  n.a.    n.a.    n.a. 
Chile  n.a.    39      6 
Colombia  n.a.    76    43 
Costa Rica  63  116    94 
Ecuador  29    67    68 
El Salvador  50    49    71 
Guatemala  53    47    72 
Honduras  70    65    64 
Mexico  75    68    24 
Nicaragua  60    28    44 
Panama  67    n.a.    74 
Paraguay  42    48  120 
Peru  n.a.    32    43 
Uruguay  n.a.      6  108 
Venezuela  n.a.    94    47 
Source:  UNDP, Human Development Report 1996, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 152-3. 
 
 
It can be seen at a glance that in all ten countries for which we have data, the rural 
population is less likely than the urban to have access to health services.  In 13 out of 14 
countries (Costa Rica is the exception) the rural population is less likely than the urban to 
have access to safe water; and in 13 out of 15 countries (Paraguay and Uruguay are the 
exceptions) the rural population is less likely than the urban to have access to sanitation 
services.  In many instances the rural areas are at a severe disadvantage.  Indeed in 17 out 
of 39 cases a rural resident is less than half as likely as an urban resident to have access to 
the three basic services listed in the table.  
Thus it is clear that the incidence and severity of income poverty and capability poverty are higher in the 
countryside than in the cities.  Finally, as can be seen in column 6 of Table 1, in eight out of the 16 
countries, rural poverty accounts for more than half of the total population suffering income poverty, 
although without exception the eight countries are relatively small.  In Brazil (the largest country) and in 
Colombia (the third largest) rural poverty accounts for more than 40 per cent of total poverty.  Considering 
the 16 countries as a group, about 38 per cent of all the poor live and work in rural areas.
iii  Thus despite the 
high degree of urbanization in Latin America, rural poverty remains a serious problem. 
 
The System of Labor Controls 
Given that poverty is pervasive in the rural areas and that rural poverty continues to account for a 
significant proportion of all the poor in Latin America, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the 
fundamental causes of rural poverty.  The point of departure is recognition, contrary to popular belief, that 
labor is scarce in the countryside and always has been.  Natural capital, i.e., agricultural land, mineral 
resources and forests, is abundant and the problem facing any employer is how to ensure that scarce labor 
can be made available so that the region’s natural capital can be exploited profitably.  The problem of labor 
scarcity has been overcome historically by devising a system of labor controls, which varies from one 
country to another and from one historical period to another.
iv 
 
At the time of the Spanish conquest the dominant system of labor control was the encomienda.  This was a 
system of taxation that compelled the indigenous population to enter the labor market and work for 
Europeans so that an income could be earned with which to pay taxes.  The effect of the tax system on the 
indigenous people of the countryside was to shift the supply curve of labor to the right and lower real 
incomes.  The encomienda system had to be abandoned however when the population began to decline 
sharply: labor scarcity became acute and more radical measures to control labor became necessary. 
 
In some regions forced labor (the  mita) was introduced.  In other regions, notably in Brazil and the 
Caribbean islands, labor was imported from Africa and slavery became widespread.  In still other regions, 
concertaje, a form of serfdom or debt peonage, emerged.  Finally, sharecropping and other forms of 
insecure tenancy arrangements became common in the 19
th and 20
th centuries (e.g., huasipungo in Ecuador 
and inquilinaje in Chile). 
 
Despite the numerous modifications  that have taken place over time, labor controls are an enduring feature 
of the human landscape of rural Latin America.  The economic function of these controls is to alter the 
terms on which labor is acquired by employers and to ensure a captive work force for landowners.  The 
combined effect of the system of labor controls is to produce poverty, by reducing real wages and the 
standard of living of campesinos below what they otherwise would have been.  
The modern system of labor controls can be divided into three sub-systems, namely, social controls, 
environmental controls and institutional controls.  These control mechanisms influence the dimensions of 
the labor market and the relative bargaining strength of the participants and hence the context in which the 
ordinary forces of supply and demand operate. 
 
Social controls 
Let us begin with social controls.  These consist essentially of cultural barriers to the occupational mobility 
of labor.  Their effect is to differentiate labor, to enable employers to discriminate between workers and, 
when carried to an extreme, to create non-competing groups.  Social controls lead to segmentation of the 
rural labor market on the basis, for example, of “race” or ethnicity, language, dress or sex.  The effect of 
labor market segmentation is to shift the supply curve of low skilled labor to the right and thereby reduce 
wages below what they otherwise would have been.  That is, social controls keep campesinos in their 
“place” at the lowest stratum of the rural work force. 
 
In Andean America, for instance, language acts as a social control.  Campesinos who speak Quechua in 
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia encounter barriers to occupational mobility.  Indeed the practical definition of an 
“Indian” in Andean America is based on language; it certainly is not based on purity of blood.  The 
language barrier helps to keep the indigenous population in the Sierra or the Altiplano where they are 
available to potential employers.  The effect of this barrier on reducing the wage rate is illustrated in Figure 
1. 











Figure 1:  Effect of social controls on the labor market for low skilled rural workers 
 
Actual labor market conditions are represented by the demand curve for labor (DL) and the supply curve 
(SL).  These supply and demand conditions produce a wage rate equal to w.  Labor supply, however, is 
“artificially” increased -- surplus labor is created -- by the social control over language: Quechua speakers 
suffer from reduced job choices and occupational mobility.  In the absence of a language barrier, the supply 
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  w curve of labor would be SL* and the resulting wage rate (w*) would be higher than the actual wage (w).  In 
other words, cultural phenomena such as language barriers, “racial” differences and ethnic distinctions have 
economic consequences.  Social controls are not historical accidents or cultural artifacts; they are part of a 





Social controls are re-enforced by environmental controls, which further reduce occupational mobility and, 
more important, reduce the geographical mobility of labor.  That is, environmental controls lead to the 
spatial fragmentation of the labor market: what might otherwise be a unified, integrated rural labor market 
is broken up into a myriad of small, local, fragmented labor markets.  Illiteracy, a poor general education, 
lack of training facilities and inadequate means of transmitting information in rural areas strengthen 
linguistic and other social controls.  The campesino is kept in ignorance.  The lack of investment in human 
capital helps to keep the rural population in their “place,” i.e., i gnorance and lack of schooling are 
functional. 
 
The campesino also is kept in isolation.  There was a time when the rural labor force almost literally was 
enclosed within the hacienda.  Today, geographical and physical isolation are results of poor transport and 
communications systems rather than restraints exercised by landowners over their “Indians”.  The scarcity 
of secondary roads and of vehicles, particularly in some of the more remote regions, has resulted in a 
spatial fragmentation of the labor market which sometimes is overlooked by analysts who focus on the 
extensive rural-to-urban migration of labor.  Bolivia, for example,  
“is a vast country of 1.1 million square km, yet it has only 37,600 km of roads.  
Approximately 10,000 km consists of the principal highway connecting Santa Cruz, 
Cochabamba and La Paz with international routes.  Of this, only 1500 km are paved.  
Another 4000 km are passable year round; 1490 km are passable in the dry season and 




In a situation such as this, it makes little sense to talk in general terms about “the” rural labor market.  
There is a multiplicity of specific markets, segregated by language, sex, distance and ignorance, and 
coincident with the village, the hacienda or the “Indian” community.  These environmental controls, like 
the social controls, depress rural incomes. 
 
Iinstitutional controls Finally, there are the institutional controls.  These comprise the innumerable organizations (church, trade 
unions, landowners’ associations), codes of law and instruments of coercion which affect resource 
allocation and individual behavior.  Above all, however, is the concentration of land ownership and the 
latifundia system, because in an agrarian economy, control of the land ipso facto gives landowners control 
over the labor force.  That is, the effect of land concentration is to give landowners monopsony power in 
the local labor market.  This lowers the wage rate below what it would have been in a competitive labor 
market and has analogous effects in the land market on crop sharing contracts and fixed rental contracts. 
 
The effect of the interacting systems of social, environmental and institutional controls is to atomise the 
rural labor force into highly vulnerable groups of workers confronted by landowners who, in the specific 
localities in which they operate, have a monopoly of the material means of production.  This local 
monopoly of productive resources, and the accompanying monopoly of sources of employment, gives the 
landowner a partial  monopsony of labor as well.  This inevitably has deleterious consequences for the level 
of employment and standard of living of the campesino, and for the distribution of income, the utilization 
of land and the volume of agricultural production.  Indeed it can readily be shown that the overall effects of 
this system of labor controls are (i) to reduce total agricultural output, (ii) to create inefficiency in the use 
of resources, (iii) to lower total rural incomes, (iv) to reduce agricultural employment and create “surplus” 
labor, (v) to create a highly unequal distribution of income between landowners and campesinos, (vi) to 
raise the absolute income of landowners and (vii) to reduce the incomes of campesinos absolutely and 
thereby create rural poverty. 
 
The Market for Landless Wage Workers 
Let us start with an analysis of the rural labor market for wage workers.  The problem faced by the large 
landowner (or latifundista) is that he has land and needs labor to cultivate it.  This labor can be obtained in 
several ways: by hiring workers for a money wage, by employing a tenant for a share of the crop, or by 
hiring out land to tenants for a fixed rent.  These “pure” contracts can be combined in various ways and in 
addition  payments can be made in cash, in kind, in exchange for labor services, in exchange for the right of 
workers to use a parcel of land for their own purposes, etc.  The choice of contractual arrangement will be 
influenced by several factors, including attitudes toward risk, cost of managerial supervision, importance of 
economies of scale in production and marketing, provisions of land tenure legislation, and so on.  These are 
matters of considerable practical importance, but they do not alter a fundamental proposition, namely, that 
the latifundista will adjust the terms of the contract with workers such that the net income of campesinos 
will be roughly the same whether they work as wage laborers, sharecroppers or fixed rent tenants.  The key 
issue is whether or not the landowner can exercise monopsony power. 
 
Consider Figure 2, a monopsonistic market for rural wage workers.  The supply curve of wage workers in 
the local labor market is represented by SL.  Remember that this supply curve will already have been shifted to the right by the social and environmental controls discussed earlier and hence the campesinos enter the 
labor market at a considerable disadvantage.  Be that as it may, in the absence of monopsony power, the 
“competitive” level of employment will be E c and the “competitive” market determined wage will be wc, as 
determined by the intersection of the demand curve (DL) with the supply curve at point C. 
 













Figure 2:  A monopsonistic rural labor market 
 
 If the landowner enjoys monopsony power, however, he will take into account the fact that he can obtain 
more labor only by offering a higher wage.  That is, he will maximize his profit by equating his marginal 
outlay or expenditure on labor (represented by the MO curve) with the marginal revenue product of labor 
(represented by the demand curve).  This occurs at point M and implies that the landowner maximizes his 
income by employing only Em workers (instead of E c) and paying them a wage rate of wm (instead of the 
higher wage, w c).  The wage workers thus are doubly harmed: they have fewer days of employment 
(equivalent to E c-Em) and they are paid a lower daily wage rate (equivalent to wc-wm).  Their total income 
falls from the area OwcCEc to OwmNEm.  That is, they are reduced to poverty. 
 
Sharecropping and Fixed Rental Contracts Under Competitive Conditions 
Imagine next that instead of seeking wage employment a campesino decides to hire land at a fixed rent 
from a landowner.  Will he be any better off?  The answer is “no” and the reason can be explained with the 
use of Figure 3.  As before, the quantity of labor is measured on the horizontal axis and costs and revenues 
on the vertical axis. 
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Figure 3:  Fixed rent and sharecropping contracts under competitive conditions 
 
 
The line AB is the marginal revenue product line of labor (analogous to the demand curve for labor in 
Figure 2) corresponding to a land holding of a given size.  It indicates that as employment on the land 
increases, the marginal product of labor decreases.  If the landowner faces competitive conditions in the 
labor market he can cultivate the land with hired labor, paying the going wage wc and employing Ec amount 
of labour.  The total value of output will be OACEc, of which OwcCEc (as in Figure 2) will be payments to 
labor and the residual w cAC will be the landowner’s profits.  Alternatively, he can hire out the land at a 
fixed rent equal to wcAC.  His tenant will then have an incentive, given the opportunity cost of his labor of 
wc, to apply E c amount of labor to his rented farm, and consequently total output and the division of output 
between the tenant and landowner will be the same as before.  It makes no difference whether the land is 
cultivated with hired labor or turned over to a tenant for a fixed rent. 
 
Similarly, it makes no difference whether the land is turned over to a tenant in return for a share of the 
output.  There are merely two things the landowner must do.  First, he must find a “good” tenant, i.e., one 
who will supply at least E c amount of labor.  The landowner can ensure that this amount of labor is indeed 
forthcoming by threatening to evict a tenant if he turns out to be “bad”.  It is in fact precisely for this reason 
that sharecropping contracts and insecure leases are so closely associated.  Insecurity makes the threat of 
dismissal credible and that, in turn, gives the tenant a strong incentive to work hard and provide Ec amount 
of labor. 
 
Second, the landowner must offer the tenant a share of the crop so that the tenant can earn at least as much 
as he could as a hired laborer or a fixed rent tenant.  This condition is satisfied in Figure 3 by offering the 
tenant a share of OF/OA. 
Given that the labor input is OEc regardless of the contractual arrangement, total output will be the same.  
Under the sharecropping system the tenant’s income will be OFHEc.  This area is equal to OwcCEc, since 
wcG=GC; and hence the sharecropper, wage worker and fixed rent tenant all receive the same income.  
Similarly, the landowner’s share of net output is FACH, and this is equal to w cAC, his income under a 
 F 
 O 
    wc 





H fixed rental or hired worker system.  In other words, the tenure system as such has no effect on the 
distribution of income. 
 
Tenure Contracts Under Monopsony Conditions 
If the landowner is faced by labor scarcity, and hence a rising supply curve of labor, he will take this into 
account when entering into a sharecropping or fixed rental contract with a tenant.  That is, monopsony 
power in the labor market will be reflected not only in the wage paid to agricultural workers but also in the 
division of output between the landowner and his tenants and in the rental rate of land.  This can be seen in 
Figure 4 below. 
 
























Figure 4:  Sharecropping contract under monopsony conditions 
 
If the landowner wishes to adopt a wage payment system, he will hire OEm workers at a wage Owm, as we 
saw when discussing Figure 2.  The total wage bill will be OwmNEm.  Compared to competitive conditions, 
total value of output under monopsony will decline by EmMCEc, and in this sense land concentration results 
in allocative inefficiency.  The landowner’s income, however, will increase by the difference between 
wmwcDN (formerly received by the workers) and DMC (the landowner’s dead-weight loss).  That is, the 
landowner’s income or profit under a wage payment system will be the area wmAMN. 
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L Notice that the marginal cost of labor as perceived by the landowner (m) is substantially higher than the 
wage he pays (wm) and somewhat higher than the social opportunity cost of labor as measured by the 
competitive wage (wc).  We thus have a set of inequalities, w m<wc<m, which reflect the fact that the 
incentive system resulting from land concentration induces the landowner to use techniques of production 
which economize excessively on labor (wc<m), while the actual wage is below the opportunity cost of labor 
(wm<wc). 
 
As in the case of competitive conditions, the introduction of alternative ways of acquiring labor does not 
alter the results.  If the landowner wishes to adopt a sharecropping system, for instance, the landowner 
would require the tenant to supply OEm  inputs of labor (using the threat of dismissal to enforce the 
requirement) and in return offer the tenant a share in net income equal to FO/AO.  Notice that the tenant’s 
share under the monopsony conditions described in Figure 4 is much lower than the tenant’s share under 
the competitive conditions described in Figure 3.  Indeed the total income of campesinos working under 
monopsony conditions would be the same whether they are sharecroppers or wage laborers, since 
wmG=GN. 
 
In summary, rural poverty in Latin America is a product of the system of labor controls and in particular of 
the monopsonistic control of the labour force exercised by large landowners in small, fragmented local 
markets.  The large proportion of unutilized and poorly utilized land and the consequent low volume of 
production are the inevitable products of a system in which landowners do not exploit their land fully in 
order to be able to obtain cheap labor.  Paradoxically, however, the low wages and incomes of campesinos 
are associated with a low labor intensity of production on the large farms.  Indeed, it is the contrived 
reduction in the demand for labor that causes wages and the share of output received by tenants to be low 
and the degree of inequality in the distribution of income to be great.  Finally, despite the low wages and 
crop shares, the marginal cost of labor to large landowners is high, and this reduces the incentive of large 
landowners to invest in agriculture, thereby reducing the rate of growth of agricultural output below what it 
otherwise would have been. 
 
Policy Implications 
The most obvious policy implication of the preceding analysis is that rural poverty in Latin America can 
best be reduced by destroying or weakening the system of labor controls by attacking each of the three sub-
systems, namely, social controls, environmental controls and institutional controls.  In many countries the 
lynch-pin of the entire system is the concentration of land ownership and hence redistributive land reforms 
merit serious consideration.  Indeed land redistribution is almost certainly the easiest and quickest way to 
reduce the monopsony power of landowners in rural labor markets.  A highly unequal distribution of land 
has been a source of conflict in Latin America for centuries and in recent years has led to civil war in parts 
of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua), violence in Andean America (especially in Colombia and Peru), major disturbances in southern Mexico (notably in Chiapas) and political agitation in 
Brazil.  The land reform issue simply will not go away. 
 
In countries where land reform is politically impossible at present, alternative options can be explored.  A 
progressive land tax, for example, would give large landowners an incentive to sell some of their land and 
this could lead to a gradual reduction in the concentration of land ownership.  A land tax also could create 
an incentive for landowners to cultivate their land more intensively and this would increase the demand for 
labor, raise rural wage rates and help to reduce poverty. 
 
Any measure that raises the demand for labor will help to alleviate poverty.  Labor intensive public works 
projects can be particularly attractive because they raise the demand for labor directly and also create 
productive physical assets that raise the productivity of labor permanently.  Investment in secondary roads, 
for instance, have the added advantage of weakening environmental controls, reducing the physical 
isolation of campesinos and increasing the mobility of labor.  Anything that increases average rural wages 
for low skilled workers will not only reduce rural poverty, it will also increase the “reservation wage” of 
potential rural migrants and thereby set a wage floor in urban areas.  This, in turn, will help to reduce urban 
poverty and improve the distribution of income in urban areas. 
 
In other words, rural and urban poverty are closely connected.  One linkage is through migration of labor: 
rural poverty can lead to an exodus of labor to the cities notwithstanding environmental controls which 
limit geographical and occupational mobility.  Another linkage is through wage rates and income levels: 
low rural incomes are reflected in low urban incomes, particularly in the urban informal sector and in 
domestic service employment.  It follows from this that urban poverty can best be tackled by addressing the 
root of the problem in rural areas.  In fact if the rural areas are neglected and policy efforts are concentrated 
on reducing urban poverty, the effect may simply be to encourage the rural poor to relocate to the cities.
vi 
 
There are windows of opportunity that can be exploited by policy makers concerned with rural poverty.  
For example, it is increasingly recognized in Latin America that the role of the state in providing 
infrastructure needs to be strengthened.  Less emphasis today is placed on shrinking the state than was 
recently the case and more emphasis is placed on reforming the state so that it allocates resources more 
efficiently and more equitably.  Similarly, as regards investment in infrastructure, in some countries, 
perhaps a growing number, advocacy of privatization has been tempered by recognition of the need for the 
state to provide transport, communications and electric power, particularly in the countryside.  This new 
perception of the role of the state provides a justification for public works programs that can benefit the 
rural poor. 
 A second window of opportunity arises from the fact that it is now widely recognized that credit markets 
are highly imperfect, often failing to allocate capital to projects with high social rates of return.
vii  Poor 
people in particular do not have access to formal sector capital markets and hence are denied opportunities 
to create alternative sources of livelihood within the rural sector.  Yet experience in Bolivia with the Banco 
Solidario, in Bangladesh with the Grameen Bank and in many other developing countries shows that 
lending programs can be designed to reach the poor, that the poor have good repayment records and that 
socially profitable projects can be identified and implemented by the poor.  There are thus good reasons for 
the state and non-governmental organizations to give priority to lending to the rural poor.  Employment 
created by micro-credit schemes will weaken monopsony power in the labor market and undermine the 
system of labor controls. 
 
A third window of opportunity arises from the fact that it is now agreed that investment in human capital, 
notably in education and health, can produce a rate of return as high as investment in physical capital.
viii  
Moreover it has been shown that the returns on human capital increase as one moves from the top to the 
bottom of the expenditure pyramid.  That is, within education, say, the returns to expenditure on primary 
education are higher than the returns on secondary education, and the returns to expenditure on secondary 
education are higher than the returns on tertiary education.
ix  Policy makers would therefore be justified on 
efficiency grounds alone in reallocating public expenditure on health and education to favor the rural poor.  
Such a reallocation of government spending to expand rural education, basic health services and other 
forms of “human capital formation” could have the additional advantages of helping the poor meet their 
basic needs, increasing human development generally and undermining some of the environmental controls 
that create and perpetuate poverty. 
 
Many international organizations and outside analysts as well as some policy makers advocate greater 
government decentralization and a devolution of authority to the local level.  Unless the distribution of 
political power is changed, however, it is doubtful that decentralization as such would do much to help the 
poor.  The movement to strengthen local government does however create an opportunity for those 
concerned about poverty to link administrative reform to the strengthening of democratic institutions at the 
local level.  The poor should have the right to organize themselves in institutions of their choice and their 
civil rights should be protected in law and by those responsible for enforcing the law.  These changes 
would help to reduce poverty by weakening some institutional controls and by creating a more equal 
balance of bargaining power. 
 
It was once thought that measures to reduce poverty and inequality would have a cost in terms of a slower 
rate of growth.  Modern research however has shown that a more equal distribution of income and wealth, 
and the reduction in poverty that greater equality would permit, are more likely than not to increase the 
flow of savings, the level of investment and the rate of growth of output.
x  There is, in fact, no “trade-off” between growth and equity; the two go hand-in-hand.  In other words, one of the arguments used to oppose 
anti-poverty programs has been shown to be false and once this becomes widely known it should be easier 
to build alliances and coalitions to support policies that favor the poor. 
 
The poor however are heterogeneous; they are not a homogeneous class.  And they are poorly organized to 
influence policy.  This is true of poor people in general and of the rural poor as well.  Because of this 
heterogeneity, several types of state intervention will be necessary to eradicate rural poverty.  There is no 
single solution.  Action will have to occur on a broad front, addressing each component of the system of 
labor controls.  This will require coordination by the state, a task which is far from simple.  The prospect, 
however, is that if a well designed set of complementary measures can be implemented, efficiency and 
equity should increase and poverty should decrease dramatically. NOTES 
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